ABSTRACT Device-to-device (D2D) communications can effectively offload the traffic of cellular system in a distributed way. However, during the data forwarding process, malicious D2D users can intermittently discard data of other users, which seriously affects the data forwarding efficiency. Therefore, a maliciousforwarding-behavior-aware link selection mechanism (MBLS) is proposed in this paper to alleviate the influence of malicious attacks. User behaviors are analyzed according to the correlation between the social relationship and forwarding behavior of users, and the identification of malicious behavior is obtained by Elman neural network. Thus, malicious users can be detected, and then the optimal link can be selected. The simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively detect the malicious behaviors of D2D users, notably improve the reliability of data transmission and significantly enhance the network performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-device (D2D) communications, defined in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), enable users to communicate directly through sharing cellular resources under the control of the cellular system. D2D technology can relieve the burden of base station [1] - [3] and reduce the communication delay [4] . Compared with the traditional cellular communication, D2D communications have the following advantages: 1) The higher data rate, lower latency and lower power consumption can be achieved because of the shortrange and direct D2D communications.
2) The demand of local data sharing can be met to provide flexible data services; 3. Widely distributed terminals can expand the network coverage via D2D direct communications [5] , [6] .
However, due to the vulnerable character of wireless link on the user access side [7] , the data forwarding security is critical during the cooperative data transmission process of D2D communications [8] . Many studies on D2D communications focus on wireless resource allocation, interference control [9] - [13] , while security issues are ignored in these studies [14] - [16] .
In fact, the proportion of selfish D2D users can lead to a significant difference in the willingness of cooperation, and these users selectively forward data according to factors like relation intensity and resource consumption [17] . Selfish users have regular forwarding behaviors because of the social attributes [18] - [22] , namely their willingness to cooperate changes with the user relationship. In addition, malicious D2D users in the network can intermittently and maliciously discard data from other D2D users to disrupt the network performance and even to cause network paralysis. Apparently, the data discarding behaviors of malicious users are random and the forwarding willingness is irrelevant to the relationship between users, which is different from the selfish behaviors. Besides, the discarding probability also presents the high volatility [23] - [25] . Obviously, these malicious behaviors cause the waste of network resources and a huge threat to the data transmission security. Currently, how to accurately detect malicious users, assess the trust status between users and choose reliable links are the key D2D security issues.
In addition to the above problems, D2D communications also face the following security challenges: 1) User activities are highly socialized. How can we associate behaviors with social relationships to accurately detect malicious users? 2) Both of the selfish D2D users and malicious D2D users can selectively forward data, while selfish users are not intentionally disrupting network performance. How can we distinguish these behaviors? 3) Due to the user mobility and time-related behaviors, the data volume transmitted between D2D users is relatively big. How can we dynamically identify malicious users in the complex network environment?
To solve these 3 problems, an attack detection mechanism is proposed in this paper. Firstly, the historical data are recorded during the contact process to perceive malicious behaviors and the credibility of users, through distinguishing the forwarding behaviors of malicious and non-malicious users. Thanks to DFT function, a malicious user detection method based on Elman neural network is proposed. Meanwhile the threshold learning is based on the D2D contact state to optimize the prediction result and then establish the optimal link. The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• A user attribute authentication method is proposed.
By analyzing the relationships and forwarding behaviors of users, behavioral attributes of D2D users can be identified.
• A user behavior detection method based on social behavior perception is proposed. According to the contact history, contact states including contact depth and contact width are estimated to accurately perceive the relationship between users. Furthermore, the intimate degrees of user relationships are analyzed under different scenarios for the behavior detection.
• A malicious user detection method based on Elman neural network is proposed. Due to the volatility of malicious behaviors, the learning samples of Elman neural network are provided by DFT function to obtain the tags of malicious users. Then the dynamical threshold learning of Elman neural network can be achieved to acquire the optimal result. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related works are introduced in Section II. The forwarding behaviors of D2D users and system model are described and designed in Section III. Section IV introduces the social relationship estimation method. The Elman neural network based malicious user detection method is proposed in Section V, and Section VI presents the D2D link selection method. Simulation results are analyzed in Section VII. Lastly, the conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Aiming at the secure link selection in D2D networks, researchers proposed various solutions. Reference [26] proposed a multilayer authentication protocol and a secure session key generation method to establish reliable links that provided low computational cost with high security. Reference [27] proposed a K + − isomorphism method to achieve K− anonymization state among subgraphs or detected communities in a given social network, which guaranteed the security of communication links. Reference [7] established a joint game model based on social trust and social reciprocity and designed a cooperation strategy based on social relationships. However, data theft, data discarding and other potential security threats were not considered and analyzed. According to the Markov model, the Coleman fusion method was exploited in [28] to aggregate the feedback of users, and the trust status between users including the trust degree and trust variance was evaluated to mitigate the impact of malicious feedback on networks. However, the proposed method assumed that all nodes were cooperative and ignored the malicious behaviors, which severely restricted the rationality and applicability. In [29] , the trust degree between users was quantified and the user behavior was evaluated by the user feedback, and the relay was further selected according to the user reliability. However, the quantification is too difficult to accurately perceive the malicious users, and the pre-set threshold cannot meet the dynamic requirements of networks. Obviously, existing security mechanisms did not fully consider the status and forwarding capabilities of users and cannot ensure the cooperation, credibility and suitable forwarding link. Furthermore, in most of the malicious behavior detection studies, users were classified based on their cooperation degrees, which easily mistook selfish users for malicious users [30] - [32] .
The development of mobile social networks facilitates the connection between mobile devices and contact relationship estimation of D2D users. Reference [33] and [34] utilized the behavior patterns to perceive the long-term neighbor relationship, namely to divide users into communities according to contact frequencies. But these papers only considered the user mobility, ignored the user interest, which incurred the blindness and passivity in the measuring process. In [35] and [36] , the mobility and interest of users were both taken into account, and users frequently moving between multiple communities were defined as central users. However, the static estimation with only a single factor can lead to the inaccurate estimation results.
To address the above issues, a D2D link selection mechanism based on malicious user perception is proposed in this paper. By dynamically mining the social contact between users, detecting the relationship between forwarding rate and social behavior, malicious users can be recognized according to the authenticated data discarding behaviors. Furthermore, the efficient data forwarding decisions can be made to ensure the reliability of data transmission, improve network resource utilization effectively and reduce the network load.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , D2D users communicate directly with cellular-assigned links, which allows attackers sneak into the server or user applications, steal personal data and violate user privacy [37] . Due to the nature of radio broadcast, attackers may launch denial of service, man in the middle, free rides, impersonate attack and other kinds of attacks during the data transmission process [38] , [39] . In particular, some malicious users may discard the data received from other users, which results in communication failures and network paralysis. Apparently, the detection of malicious data discarding behaviors and effective link selection are critical to D2D security. Therefore, a maliciousforwarding-behavior-aware D2D link selection mechanism is proposed to analyze the trust relationship among users, prevent malicious users from disrupting the network and attacking users in the network, choose the most credible relay user, reduce the corresponding risk and increase the data delivery rate.
According to the behavioral attributes of users, D2D users can be divided into non-malicious users and malicious users. Non-malicious users can be further divided into collaborative users and selfish users according to their cooperation willingness. Collaborative users in the network actively participate in cooperative D2D communications and efficiently forward data. Selfish users selectively forward data due to resource constraints and other factors, meanwhile their cooperation willingness changes with the user relationship. For instance, selfish users actively forward data for familiar users and refuse to forward data for unfamiliar ones, which presents regularity. Oppositely to selfish users, the behaviors of malicious users can be divided into the camouflage stage and the attack stage. In the camouflage stage, the primary purpose of malicious users is to increase their trust degree and they can achieve this purpose through the following two ways: one is providing false information, such as identity attributes, when joining the network; the other one is camouflaging into collaborative users and actively forwarding data for them. In the attack stage, when non-malicious users requesting D2D communications, malicious users notify the base station that they can serve as relays and utilize their high trust values to deceive the base station to assign D2D links for them, thereby malicious users can discard data, which causes data forwarding failure. It can be seen that the forwarding behaviors of malicious users present randomness and volatility, and both in the camouflage stage and attack stage, their cooperation willingness and user relationship are obviously irrelevant. By intermittently discarding data, malicious users can sabotage the stability of networks. Therefore, the primary purpose of this paper is to identify malicious users by analyzing the inherent differences between the malicious and non-malicious users in forwarding behaviors, meanwhile the trust policy is correspondingly adopted for D2D users with various behavioral attributes by the secure D2D link selection mechanism, which enables users to obtain reliable service resource and detects malicious users.
The credible D2D communication system with malicious user detection includes three parts: the base station, trust center and D2D user.
The base station is a gateway infrastructure connected to the cellular network, which is responsible for the resource allocation and coordination with the cellular network. The base station records the contact data of D2D users in the cellular network and periodically sends data to the trust center.
The trust center Authentic Server (AS) is responsible for the social contact statistics between D2D users, trust relationship calculation and the periodical calculation result report to the base station.
D2D users establish direct links for data sharing under the control of the base station. During the data transmission process, D2D users can be divided into D2D data transmitters, relays and receivers, the base station then selects the appropriate relay to establish D2D link and to complete the data communication.
To accurately detect potential attackers and select appropriate D2D links according to the user credibility, the base station records the social contact of D2D users. Each contact generates a contact behavior record
>, where Id is the unique user identity; D i is the size of data from the D2D data transmitter, D j is the size of data to the D2D data receiver and Num k (k = 0, 1) indicates the number of relays. When D2D relays exist along with D2D links, Num k records the Id of relays.
indicates the contact time of user u i and u j , and user u i will send a communication request to the base station when the D2D communication is demanded. With the D2D link established by the base station, the transmitter directly sends data to the receiver and reports the data transmission size D i to the base station. Upon receiving the data, the receiver reports the actual size of received data D j to the base station.
IV. ATTACK BEHAVIOR PERCEPTION A. TRUST RELATIONSHIP INITIALIZATION
When D2D users contact for the first time, it is necessary to initialize the trust value among users without any existing contact information for the initial link selection, which can be referred for the subsequent link selection. Therefore, to avoid randomization in the trust relationship quantification, user attributes and environment factors are exploited to calculate the initial trust value. The trust relationship initialization can be achieved with internal trust factor Trust internal ij and external trust factor Trust external i→j . Internal trust factor Trust internal ij utilizes user attributes to evaluate the consistency ratio of user identity, which indirectly reflects the trust relationship between D2D users. External trust factor Trust external i→j evaluates the user credibility by measuring the correlation between users.
For internal trust factor Trust internal ij , each user has its own identity attributes such as occupation, address, age, etc. These attributes can describe the convergence characteristics of D2D users. The higher overlap attribute Sim Z k ij signifies the higher convergence degree of user behaviors and interest. Assuming that user u i has n identity attributes
reflecting the relationship of the attributes between user u i and u j can be defined by
Thus the overlap attribute between user u i and u j can be expressed by
Furthermore, the mutual attributes δ Z k ij can be calculated by
According to the identity attributes of user u i and u j , internal trust factor Trust internal ij can be calculated.
Obviously, the more mutual attributes users share, the higher internal trust factor between two users can be obtained.
External trust factor Trust external i→j can directly evaluate the relationship between users. Generally, the more mutual friends user u i and u j share, the closer relationship and higher external trust factor between two users can be achieved, as shown in
where Frie i , Frie j stand for the number of friends of u i and u j respectively. Subsequently, the initial trust value can be calculated by
In Eq. (6), ϕ is the weight factor. Technically, the external trust factor reflects the subjective willingness for the contact preference of users and the internal trust factor indirectly estimates the trust value according to the objective identity attributes of users. In network scenarios with high user density, the relationship between users is relatively tight, and the effect of user relationship is more obvious. Thus the trust relationship evaluation depends more on the external trust factor. To sum up, the weight factor is closely related to the user density and can be calculated by Eq. (7), where θ k indicates the user density in the current communication region.
B. DATA FORWARDING RATE
As mentioned above, the cooperative D2D users directly and efficiently forward data. Obviously, the cooperative behaviors can be directly reflected by the data forwarding rate. The cooperation degree of selfish users is affected by factors such as relationship intensity and resource consumption, which cannot be arbitrarily reflected by the data forwarding rate. The data forwarding rates of malicious users are highly volatile due to the intermittent attack characteristics. Therefore the behavioral attributes of D2D users should be accurately analyzed by identifying forwarding behavior of users.
To evaluate the data forwarding behaviors, the base station transmits the contact information to the trust center, then the VOLUME 5, 2017 trust center compares D i with D j for every contact. Each D i = D j will increase the participating times of the given user by one. If D i = D j , trust center records the the data discarding behavior R los i of the given D2D transmitter, and the data discarding record of relay u relay is also updated correspondingly. Due to the impact of user mobility, link interruption may affect the data forwarding behavior evaluation process. In addition, the short contact duration and network congestion can lead to the unreliable D2D link and interrupted data transmission. Therefore, to eliminate inaccurate evaluation results caused by these data loss, the data discarding threshold R normal los i is defined in this paper and the data discarding times above the threshold are regarded as the subjective data discarding. Obviously, the impact of data discarding threshold on forwarding behavior analysis of D2D users is critical.
The D2D data transmission along a given physical link takes a certain amount of time. For users u i , u j ∈ U , the D2D data transmission is prone to interference from the multiplexed cellular user u [40] , [41] . Define P u i as the transmitting power of user u i , h u i ,u j as the channel gain between user u i and u j , thus the signal received by user u j is P u i h u i ,u j . Assuming the channel follows the Rayleigh distribution, the distance between user u i and u j is d u i ,u j , ∂ indicates the channel attenuation factor and h 0 is the Gaussian channel coefficients, the communication between users is affected by the distance and channel attenuation and the channel gain h u i ,u j between user u i and u j can be expressed by
The noise received by u i is P u h u,u j + N 0 , where N 0 is the additive white Gaussian noise received by u i and the other part is the noise brought by multiplexed cellular user u. According to the Shannon formula, the transmission rate R rate u i ,u j between D2D user u i and u j can be expressed by
Thereby the transmission delay t u i ,u j between u i and u j can be calculated by Eq. (10), and the value of t u i ,u j is related to the transmission distance and data size F data .
If the actual contact time T contact i,j is shorter than the time required for data transmission, the data transmission can not been accomplished. Under such circumstances, data loss is objectively inevitable. Otherwise, the data loss is regarded as the abnormal data discarding due to subjective factors, thus the data discarding threshold R normal los i can be determined by Eq. (11), where . denotes the round down function.
Then the number of normal data discarding can be calculated by Eq. (12), where n is the times that the data discard behavior calculated to be R normal (12) Furthermore, the trust center can obtain the forwarding rate of user u i , as shown in Eq. (13) , where N is the total number of historical social contacts of D2D users.
The difference between non-malicious and malicious D2D users lies in their forwarding behaviors and user relationship. Non-malicious users have a strong forwarding willingness for users with frequent contact and close relationship, while malicious users selectively discard or forward data and their forwarding behaviors are irrelevant to user relationship. Therefore, the correlation between user relationship and forwarding rate is utilized to identify behavioral attributes and determine the credibility of D2D users. Contact depth Int is the contact intensity between user u i and u j , which represents their intimacy degree. The contact width Int width i defines the overall historical contact data and represents the extent that the D2D user contacts with other users.
1) CONTACT DEPTH
The contact depth describes the contact intensity between D2D users and the deeper contact depth signifies the closer user relationship. When users contact with each other, the forwarding willingness for important users is strong. Therefore, the relationship between users can be directly reflected by the contact depth, and then the importance of users can be detected. The relationship between users mainly depends on the social factors and physical factors, which are defined as interest consistency Int depth soc ij (t) and contact tightness Int depth phy ij (t). The interest consistency indicates the interest overlap ratio of two users, and the contact tightness indicates the consistency of users in the moving processes.
The similarity degree of the sharing resource during social contact reflects the interest consistency and also shows the convergence of user behaviors, interest, etc. The higher convergence degree signifies the more similar trajectory and indicates that two users are more likely to have the same behavioral attributes and the estimation is more trustworthy. In addition, the friend relationship between users is often formed due to common interest, thus the convergence degree of interest can indirectly reflect the intimate degree between users. Therefore, for data transmitted or requested by user u i and where w i is the weight of the data D i in the contact record, representing the frequency of the data being quoted, k indicates the times of the same data requested by user u i and u j , m and n indicate the data size transmitted by user u i and u j respectively.
Besides, when users contact directly, the contact tightness indicates the contact intensity between users, which is not only related to the contact frequency, but also to the contact duration. Therefore, the calculation of contact tightness 
Obviously, as the contact duration grows, the contact tightness exponentially increases. F i and F j represent contact frequency of user u i and u j within the fixed period T respectively and l is the contact frequency between two users. (t) affect the contact depth, and the greater interest consistency indicates the stronger contact relationship between two users. Meanwhile, the initial trust value reflects the relationship of users to initialize the contact links. The greater the initial trust value is, the closer the relationship between users is, and the bigger the impact on the contact relationship is. Thus combined with the initial trust value, the contact depth is defined by Eq. (17) 
When there is no contact between two users in a given period, the encounter frequency between two users decreases, and the data cannot be immediately transmitted. The reliability of trust relationship assessment decreases with the decline of contact intensity between users, therefore it is necessary to adopt the user relationship attenuation mechanism to update the relationship intensity between users for the trust calculation accuracy. If there is no contact records in a given period of time, the contact relationship will reduce as shown in Eq. (18), where (1 + sin n) means the contact depth decreases exponentially when there is no contact records between users in the nth periods.
2) CONTACT WIDTH On one hand, the contact width characterizes the influence of user u i on the network. On the other hand, as the contact times increase, users will consume enormous energy and cache resources. The increased contact width leads to the more active user behaviors and the higher resource consumption. When the contact data increases, selfish D2D users will selectively forward data to reduce their own resource consumption [42] . Therefore when assessing the relationship between users, it is necessary to consider the contact width, which estimates the resource consumption and forwarding willingness of D2D users. The contact width estimation mainly depends on the overall contact data. Assuming the system contains n D2D users marked by U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n } respectively, the definition of contact width of user u i in period T is:
where
is the ath contact duration between u i and u j , x ij−a is the data traffic between u i and u j per unit time, m is the contact frequency between u i and u j and k is the number of users contacting with u i during the period.
The contact depth and contact width not only indicate the user relationship, but also directly reflect the data forwarding willingness of users and their impacts on the network. On one hand, when estimating the trust relationship between two users, different contact depths will lead to different trust values. On the other hand, when the contact becomes wider, the influence on the network is also greater. Therefore, during the trust evaluation process, not only the relationship between user behaviors, but also the activities of users should be taken into account. Specifically, the closer relationship between users signifies the greater impact on the trust weight. In addition, the evaluation of the trust weight of active users is stricter since they can contact with more users. To sum up, the influence factor can be defined by Eq. (20) to characterize VOLUME 5, 2017 the impact of intimate and active degrees of users on the trust relationship.
where the influence weight θ i consists of the contact depth and contact width. When the influence of a given user is great on the network, the influence weight of user relationship is big, thus the impact on the trust evaluation is great, as shown in Eq. (21) .
V. MALICIOUS-BEHAVIOR-DETECTION
The structure of D2D network changes dynamically over time due to user mobility. In view of the latency requirements of D2D network, the static evaluation system, which leads to the deviation of evaluation results, is inapplicable for the dynamical D2D network. Neural network has the strong selflearning, self-organization, self-adaption and fault-tolerant abilities to quickly and accurately learn and distinguish complex behaviors of D2D users. Specifically, Elman neural network can handle changes of time-related user behaviors and dynamically adjust the learning threshold based on contact states to achieve the optimal prediction. Therefore the Elman neural network is adopted in this paper to evaluate the malicious degree of users, and then the appropriate D2D links can be selected.
A. MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION
As mentioned above, after acquiring the user relationship, the user attributes can be obtained according to the user relationship and forwarding behaviors. D2D users are usually affected by user relationship, and the data forwarding behaviors are closely related to the contact between users, therefore the willingness to forward data increases with the contact time. In addition, the forwarding behavior is affected by the resource, cache and other restrictions, thus the probability to protect resources and not forward data increases with contact width. In short, the forwarding willingness of non-malicious D2D users is positively correlated with their contact depths, and is negatively correlated with their contact widths, thus there is a regularity in forwarding willingness of non-malicious D2D users. Malicious users will change their data forwarding behaviors based on the degree of being accepted by the network, and by means of intermittent attacks, malicious users can reduce the probability of being detected, thus the relationship between forwarding willingness and user relationship is irregular for malicious users and the forwarding behaviors of malicious users also show volatility. The malicious users are detected mainly based on the difference in the forwarding behavior. Apart from the impact of θ i , the contact depth and contact width jointly reflect the ''contact specificity'' between user u j and u i , namely the importance of the contact relationship Int depth ij between them. Moreover, the contact depth and the contact width can also reflect the proportion of the contact relationship with a given user accounts for the total historical contact of user u i . Therefore, the definition of specific factor is shown by Eq. (22) .
Int width i (22) As the degree of the contact specificity increases, user u j is more important to user u i , and the willingness of u i to forward data from u j is also stronger. For u i and u j , the relationship between the forwarding rate and importance of contact can be expressed as the behavioral volatility factor, as shown in Eq. (23) . (23) where R forward ij is the forwarding rate of user u i to u j . The behavioral volatility factor characterizes the difference of forwarding behaviors between non-malicious D2D users and malicious D2D users, which essentially reflects the behavior coherence of D2D users. According to the relationship importance, users with no malicious behavior records will forward data from others. Especially, equally important contact users will be afforded the same forwarding rate, and the forwarding behavior based on the user importance shows a smooth upward trend. If the behavioral volatility factor fluctuates, the intermittent attack behavior of malicious users is detected. In summary, the behavioral volatility factor utilizes the relationship between contact specificity and forwarding rate to describe the influence of malicious behaviors.
B. USER ATTRIBUTE AUTHENTICATION
In the process of trust evaluation, it is unnecessary to establish the learning model for weight factor of Elman neural network when establishing the behavioral attributes estimation model. The Elman neural network [43] only requires the D2D contact data vector and the label that identifies the malicious behaviors of users in the input layer, then the output layer can provide the behavioral attributes of users, namely the dichotomy of non-malicious D2D users and malicious D2D users. Besides, the Elman neural network can learn weights w i and thresholds θ from neurons within the network.
Elman neural network focuses on learning via experience. Under normal circumstances, the learning experience is from the behavior data sets of malicious users, or the user behavior labels in the learning database. Before training, the D2D contact behavior is marked in this paper, and malicious users can be detected according to the learning database. Furthermore, the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) function can be exploited to establish the learning database of Elman neural network, and to obtain the user behavior labels. After using DFT to map the behavior volatility factor of D2D users into the frequency domain, the frequency domain will form side lobe if the user has any malicious behavior record. Besides, the proportion and energy of side lobe increase with the growing volatility to indicate the severer malicious degree. Therefore, after receiving the historical data generated by u i in a fixed period T , the behavioral volatility factor is mapped to the frequency domain, then the trust center calculates the malicious factor β based on the proportion of the main lobe in the frequency domain, as shown in
where E main is the energy of main lobe in the frequency domain, and E side is the energy of side lobe. Furthermore, malicious factor β can be set as the label of Elman neural network to identify the behavioral attributes of D2D users.
] received as the training sample by the input layer consists of historical contact behaviors of D2D users. Through the learning of this data vector and the corresponding user attribute identification tag, the hidden layer can obtain weight w i , threshold θ and the learning algorithm for the given D2D network. Next, the hidden layer filters the historical data of users and the association layer memorizes the output value of historical information from the hidden layer and offers feedback to the hidden layer, which endows the Elman neural network with sensitivity to the historical data and enhances the processing capability of dynamic information. Finally, through the sample training of Elman neural network, the output can be classified to malicious D2D users and non-malicious D2D users.
VI. TRUST ASSESSMENT
To evaluate the trust value of D2D users and select the optimal link, the trust center utilizes the historical contact information to periodically calculate and update the trust values of users. According to the above mentioned update methods of the contact depth and contact width, influence factor α can serve as the influence weight of u i . For instance, if α of a given user in the network is bigger than others with the same malicious degree, its trust value should be reduced. The forwarding rate R forward i can reflect the cooperation degree of non-malicious users and users with different forwarding rates should be given different trust values. For users whose initial trust values cannot be estimated, the values are supposed to be 0. Once a user is detected to have malicious attack behaviors, namely β = 0, then this user will be marked as a malicious user and be banned from receiving data from others when the adjacent users choose D2D links. Apparently, the trust values of malicious users drop dramatically.
In addition, the trust value update mechanism is introduced for the behavioral attributes of users. With the continuous monitoring of the historical contact data of D2D users, it is necessary to combine the previously calculated trust value with newly generated contact data to synthesize the current trust value. Thus the trust center updates the trust value every T to create the fair environment for normal D2D users to cooperate with each other, and to furthermore remove the malicious users. Therefore, the trust value is calculated as follows:
VII. LINK SELECTION STRATEGY
According to the malicious attack detection mechanism proposed in this paper, the trust center can accurately perceive the forwarding ability and behavioral attributes of D2D users based on the historical contact information, and filter the appropriate relay candidates with the trust value calculated above before establishing the D2D link. Then the base station allocates the microcellular channel and conducts the high quality communication. Consequently, the establishment of D2D links in the data transmission process can significantly improve the communication quality. The selection of D2D pairs is based on cooperation when establishing D2D links, and the mechanism proposed in this paper can eliminate the malicious users in the network. When users communicate with each other in the network, the forwarding rate is adopted to estimate the forwarding abilities of users due to the demand of efficient data transmission. Therefore, the malicious degrees of users and data transmission capacity are considered in the data transmission process.
When initializing the trust relationship, the trust center firstly verifies whether there is any historical contact between the communication requester and relay candidates within the current communication range. Newly jointed D2D users will assess the internal trust factor Trust internal ij and external trust factor Trust external i→j based on their own attributes in the case of no contact data generated. Then users in the network select appropriate D2D links according to the initial trust relationship. The base station will record the contact data and generate the contact behavior record Record ij , and then submit the recorded historical contact information to the trust center after D2D users contact. The trust center then calculates the forwarding rate based on the contact behavior record submitted by the base station.
Due to the dynamic nature of D2D networks and the vulnerability of the user-side wireless link, the malicious users can disrupt the network performance, thus it is crucial to effectively detect them. According to the forwarding behaviors and user relationship, the user attributes can be intuitively identified by the proposed mechanism, the data delivery rate can be improved, and the network load can be reduced. As mentioned above, the trust center firstly utilizes contact depth Int On one hand, they describe user relationship and directly reflect the impact of data forwarding on the network, namely the user relationship based impact on trust weight. Active VOLUME 5, 2017 users with a wide range of contacts can obtain more D2D data, and the impact of active users on the network is correspondingly greater, meanwhile the trust evaluation of these active users is much stricter. Thus the contact depth and contact width can define influence factor α to characterize the impact of user intimacy and activity on the trust value. On the other hand, the behavioral attributes of users can be detected according to the contact depth, contact width and forwarding rate. The difference between non-malicious users and malicious users lies in their forwarding behaviors and user relationships. Namely, for non-malicious user, there is close relationship between the forwarding behavior and user relationship. Malicious users selectively discard or forward data based on its own intentions, and there is no relationship between the forwarding behavior and user relationship, thus the forwarding rate shows great volatility. According to the relationship between the forwarding rate of u i to u j and the importance of D2D pairs, behavioral volatility fac-
can be defined. Meanwhile, malicious factor β is calculated and the malicious user is detected. Through the estimation of the malicious degree, reward and penalty system can be implemented for users with different behavioral attributes, and the intensity of reward and penalty is differentiated based on influence factor α. In conclusion, the candidates within the communication range are managed as follows. When the relay candidates have no malicious behavior record, the cooperation degrees can be estimated based on the forwarding rates. The appropriate D2D users will be selected as relays according to the priority of trust relationship, and there are incentives for D2D users who has been successfully communicated with each other. When the relay candidates are detected as malicious users, they will be marked by the trust center and their trust values will be dramatically reduced. The pseudo code of proposed MBLS is shown in algorithm I.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The infocom06 real-world mobile data set is adopted in the simulation [44] , and the D2D link performance is verified based on the malicious behavior detection mechanism. The evaluation in this section is mainly focused on the performance gain and effectiveness of our proposed MBLS in the real mobility traces. For this purpose, we compare MBLS with TB [29] and STC [7] mechanisms. The TB mechanism establishes D2D transmission link based on the calculated trust value and the identified trusted user and untrusted user. The STC mechanism designs a cooperation strategy based on social relationship and social behaviors of D2D users, and establishes the coalitional game model for the social reciprocity phenomenon. The performances of these mechanisms are compared from metrics such as the message attack rate, data delivery rate, malicious user detection rate and cooperative user misjudgment rate. Furthermore, the influence of the link selection strategy on the network performance is analyzed under different degrees of malicious attacks. Specifically, the message attack rate is the ratio of data discarded 4: Computing the malicious factor β based on the forwarding rate, contact depth and contact width with the help of Elman neural network. 5: if β = 0 then 6: users are detected to be malicious users and are banned from receiving data from other D2D users; 7: else 8: calculate the trust value of these users based on initial trust value; 9: end if 10: The base station selects the candidate with the optimal trust relationship to build an appropriate D2D link; 11: t = t + T ; 12: Update the basic information with time t. by malicious users to all data and the data delivery rate is the ratio of received data to all data. The malicious user detection rate is the ratio of the number of malicious users successfully recognized by the trust center to the total number of malicious users. The cooperative user misjudgment rate is the ratio of the number of mistakenly recognized non-malicious users to the total number of non-malicious users. The simulation parameters are given in Table 1 .
A. IMPACT OF MALICIOUS USER PROPORTION ON NETWORK PERFORMANCE
The impact of malicious users on network performance is verified in this Section. 2 shows the message attack rates of three mechanisms under different proportions of malicious users. Apparently, MBLS and TB can detect malicious users. Specifically, MBLS mechanism is aiming at the characteristic of intermittent attacks by malicious users and it can detect malicious users more quickly while reducing the message attack rate. With no malicious behaviors recorded tentatively, malicious users detected by evaluating user contact results of TB mechanism can lead to the probability of misjudging malicious users as cooperative users. Besides, the intermittent attack characteristics of malicious users cause the ineffective detections of TB mechanism, thus the message attack rate of TB is higher than that of MBLS. The message attack rate of STC increases the fastest because STC does not take the malicious users into consideration. Fig. 3 shows the impact of different malicious user ratios on the message delivery rate. With the proportion of malicious users increases, MBLS and TB show better stability. Because STC cannot detect non-cooperative behaviors, malicious users can attack the network and disrupt the network performance easily. TB mechanism can detect malicious users and prevent users from attacking to some degree by evaluating the contact results of users. However, the attack detection method is too simple to effectively detect malicious behaviors, thus it may easily misjudge the malicious users as collaborative users with no attack behaviors detected. In this case, the accuracy and network performance of TB mechanism decrease, thus its delivery rate is lower than that of MBLS. Fig. 4 shows the impact of different malicious user ratios on malicious user detection results. Malicious user detection results include malicious user detection rate and cooperative user misjudgment rate. MBLS and TB can both recognize the malicious behaviors. MBLS detects the user attack behaviors in D2D networks more accurately according to the historical contact information obtained by the base station, and reduces the chance of data being obtained by malicious users. Although TB can identify some of the malicious users according to the feedback of users, it cannot identify the reliability of the feedback, therefore misjudgment occurs frequently when some of the malicious users switch their forwarding states. It is necessary to enhance the detail analysis of attack behaviors. For STC, the detection rate of malicious users is 0 since there is no detection method for malicious users.
B. IMPACT OF USER QUANTITY ON NETWORK PERFORMANCE
The influence of the link selection strategy on the performance of D2D networks with different number of users is mainly analyzed in this part. In the simulation of the impact of user number on the network performance, the proportion of malicious users is 20%. Fig. 5 shows the impact of different user ratios on the attack rate, the simulation result indicates that when the number of users increases, the performance of MBLS mechanism is relatively stable while the attack rates of TB mechanism and STC mechanism increase significantly. Among them, the attack rate of TB mechanism is relatively lower than that of STC mechanism since the TB mechanism has the function of malicious users detection. Fig. 6 shows the impact of different proportion of users on the data delivery rate. The simulation result indicates that the delivery rates of three mechanisms increase with the growing user number. As the selection of D2D links is broader with the increase of user number, the chance of choosing a link with higher quality increases and the data transmission process is also affected by the proportion of users. The user density is directly related to the link connection frequency and data VOLUME 5, 2017 transmission process. As STC has no malicious user detection method, the delivery rate is lower than those of the others. Due to the algorithm simplicity of TB, its delivery rate is compromised. Fig. 7 shows the impact of user number on the malicious user detection result. Obviously, with the increase of user density, the malicious user detection result of MBLS mechanism is better than that of TB, because MBLS can learn more samples to further improve the detection accuracy. Although most of the malicious users can be identified by TB, the detection accuracy decreases because of misjudgments.
IX. CONCLUSION
The malicious-behavior-aware D2D link selection mechanism is proposed to alleviate the influence of data discarded by malicious users on D2D network and improve the network performance. The credibility of users is distinguished based on the historical contact information. Besides, the decision of establishing D2D link is made by synthetically analyzing the trust values and forwarding capabilities of users. The simulation results show that the proposed D2D link selection mechanism can efficiently detect malicious users, meanwhile remarkably improve the data forwarding rate and effectively ensure the performance of D2D networks.
